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2It is a commonly observed characteristic of virtually every industry that firms of
different sizes co-exist for long periods of time (see Simon and Bonini, 1958;
Audretsch, 1995; and Sutton, 1997, 1998).  This empirical phenomenon contrasts with
traditional industrial organisational theory that predicts that firms with ccess to the
same technologies will, in a competitive nvironment, operate at a similar scale of
operation.1  Such considerations form the basis of competitive market theory (Viner,
1931; Stigler, 1958) and of the more recent theory of contestable markets (Baumol,
Panzar and Willig, 1982).
The competitive model does not provide an explanation of firm size
heterogeneity because it is based on an implicit assumption that all technologies and
organisational arrangements are infinitely reproducible.  Under such an assumption, all
firms use the technology generating the lowest average costs.  However, when one
technology or organisational arrangement uses an essential entrepreneurial input (or a
factor supplied by an increasing cost industry), reproduction cannot be undertaken
without rising costs.  Thus, average costs involved in using that technology will rise as
output expands.  Only a few firms might be able to enter using that technology, leaving
the market to other firms with technologies of different minimum efficient scales.  In
this paper, we show that allowing for limited reproducibility of this kind can generate
equilibrium firm size heterogeneity in a competitive/free entry setting.
By using a competitive framework, our approach stands in contrast to previous
theoretical work on the size distribution of firms.  Ijiri and Simon (1977) tackled the
regularity of industry configurations with a few large firms and many small firms by
using stochastic methods in association with Gibrat’s Law, that is, the observation that
growth rates of firms were independent of their size. They showed that a purely
stochastic mechanism2 could account for many of the stylised facts regarding the
observed size distribution of firms in many industries.  Sutton (1998) has built on the
stochastic approach.  He views firms as clusters of investment opportunities such as
plants, outlets and products that are at least as likely to be integrated in large as in small
firms and incumbent firms as opposed to entrants.  Under such conditions, he shows
3that the distribution of firm sizes will be skewed with industry assets concentrated in the
hands of a few firms.  Sutton then demonstrates that the empirically observed skewness
is consistent with this viewpoint.
Not all of the features of the observed istribution of firms appear to be
consistent with these stochastic models.  They are based on the assumption that not only
the mean but also the distribution of growth rates is unrelated to firm size.  As a result,
the distribution of firm sizes they generate is unimodal (typically lognormal).  In many
industries, such as retailing and restaurants, we observe a seemingly bimodal pattern
with many one and two-establishment enterprises and a small number of large
enterprises operating hundreds of establishments.  In the service industries, large
enterprises take the form of one or more chains of small establishments, operated either
on a franchise basis or fully owned by the parent company.  The stochastic approach
would appear to predict larger numbers of middle-sized enterprises, say, those operating
between two and one hundred establishments, han is in fact the case for those
industries.
A similar objection can be raised with regard to the competitive models of Lucas
(1978), and Calvo and Wellisz (1980).  They postulated an underlying distribution of
entrepreneurial or managerial talent in the economy and then showed that purposeful
selection by agents into worker and managerial roles, combined with an assumption of
Gibrat’s Law, could provide a competitive foundation for heterogeneous firm sizes in
equilibrium.  This heterogeneity was, however, fully accounted for by the distribution of
entrepreneurial ability.  In the absence of detailed information about distributions of the
ability of entrepreneurs attracted to different industries, their model had limited
predictive power.3
In contrast to either the stochastic process or static equilibrium approaches,
Jovanovic (1982) examines the firm size issue from a dynamic perspective.  He argues
that when firms begin production they discover potentially useful information regarding
their costs; in particular, the costs associated with expansion.  Those firms receiving
                                                                                                                                           
2  In line with his arguments concerning the importance of satisficing, Simon regarded the absence of a
4favourable cost signals grow and become large firms.  Those receiving unfavourable
signals exit.  At any point in time, therefore, large established firms and small firms who
may only be there temporarily may populate an industry.  This theoretical line can
explain a potentially bimodal firm size distribution.4
In this paper, we combine insights regarding the technology of firms and the
economics of organisation to build a simple but, we believe, very general theory of why
one should expect heterogeneity in firm size and, in particular a bimodal size
distribution, in many industries.  In so doing, we assume that free entry and exit exist in
a strong form, in that firms can be established using any available technology or
organisational form.  There are no barriers to production based on differential resources
or exclusive access to key technologies – established firms and potential entrants are
symmetric.  In addition, our model is of an industry with a homogenous product, ruling
out explanations for firm size differences based on niche exploitation or quality search
considerations (see Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; and Bagwell and Ramey, 1994).  Given our
focus on the choice of low cost technology and organisational form by firms, assuming
no start-up barriers and a homogenous product puts the maximum pressure on costly
production methods to be excluded from production.
As a result, and in contrast to Jovanovic (1982), our theory is a static equilibrium
approach.  It can, therefore, explain the co-existence of large andsmall firms in an
industry without requiring differences in survival or learning processes associated with
entry.  Our theory’s value is in its simplicity and its potential to rationalise the
persistence of firm size distributions across almost all industries; including those that
may be more mature and where small firms may persist but stay small.
Section I outlines a basic model with these elements.  There we postulate two
organisational modes.  First, there are ntrepreneurial firms.  These are managed by a
single entrepreneur.  Because of this restriction, any technology managed by such firms
                                                                                                                                           
3  A similar result is contained in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979).  Calvo and Wellisz (1980) allow for
some learning by agents before they become entrepreneurs but the size distribution of firms depends on
a prior heterogeneity of talent in the population.
5has a limited efficient scale.5  This limits their size and also means that they will operate
as price takers, entering production so long as revenue outweighs input costs and
compensates the entrepreneur for the opportunity cost of their effort.  We do assume,
however, that entrepreneurial opportunities for a given industry are limited.  Th t is,
entrepreneurs can start production in an industry by seizing an opportunity. However,
there is heterogeneity among entrepreneurial firms, with some opportunities being more
attractive than others or alternatively, some entrepreneurs facing lower costs in
identifying and exploiting opportunities than others.  This makes the use of this
technology not perfectly reproducible on an industry-wide scale. Hence, the supply
curve from entrepreneurial firms is rising.
But this is not the only possible organisational mode.  If it were, the size
distribution of firms would depend solely on any underlying heterogeneity in
entrepreneurial talent in the population.  Instead, we recognise the possibility of using
production technologies exhibiting increasing returns to scale or subadditivity in costs
(Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Romer, 1994).  Such technologies often require
large scales of production to become profitable and hence, management of such firms by
an individual entrepreneur will not, in general, be optimal.  An organisational form akin
to Williamson’s (1981) M-Form or anagerial firm is required.  That mode substitutes
away from entrepreneurial nputs towards delegated managerial decision-making.6
Firms using increasing returns technologies are unconstrained by limits on
entrepreneurial abilities, but this freedom is gained at the cost of coordination and
incentive difficulties within the organisation.  These difficulties raise the average costs of
such firms at all production scales.  However, the managerial firm can adopt
technologies that yield plant-level and enterprise level scal economies and can also
replicate plants at cost-minimising scales of production.  As such, long run average costs
need not rise as the scale of output increases.7
                                                
5 For an early expression of this idea see Kaldor (1934).
6  As described by Williamson (1981), Winter (1984) and Chandler (1990).
7  There is a literature on how incentive and coordination problems can limit firm size.  See, for
6Subject to the limited supply of entrepreneurial opportunities, we allow any firm
to enter into production with any available technology and organisational mode.  In our
simple model, entrepreneurial firms are optimal for small scales of firm production while
a managerial firm is optimal for large-scale operations.  This is because of a
complementarity between th  entrepreneurial organisational mode and nonincreasing
returns to scale (or backstop) technologies and between managerial firms and increasing
returns technologies.8  Therefore, industry configurations consisting purely of
entrepreneurial firms in perfect competition and a managerial firm that is a pure
monopoly are possible equilibria.  However, it is the interaction between firms operating
with these two organisational modes and t chnologies that is of most interest here.
Equilibria with a large number of entrepreneurial firms and a single managerial firm are
possible.  Moreover, the sustainable industry configuration could involve perfect but
inefficient competition.  This is despite the existence of a technology that would
ordinarily result in a contestable natural monopoly.9
In many ways our basic story here is a formalisation of Porter’s (1980) analysis
of strategic groups within industries.10  Like this paper, he notes that in many industries
firm sizes are characterised by a bimodal distribution with a group of larger firms that
have full product lines and high rates of vertical integration and a group of smaller firms
that occupy niche areas and produce in low volumes.  The reason smaller firms do not
grow to be in larger firms arises because the large firms utilise technologies and other
strategic variables that create entry barriers for firms of a similar type.  However,
opportunities do exist for small-scale entry, even despite the existence of entry barriers
to large firms.  Our model, however, abstracts from the complexity of Porter’s approach
by focusing on the homogenous products case and not explicitly considering issues of
                                                
8 This type of complementarity was emphasised by Winter (1984) in his distinction between
‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘routinised’ technological regimes. 
9  The model presented here is related to dominant firm models in industrial organisation (Tirole, 1988).
Such models involve a dominant firm interacting with a competitive fringe that exists because of its
control over natural resources or ability to enter with positive capacity.  The difference here will be the
critical role of entrepreneurs.  This is important because the model presented in this paper accounts for
persistent firm size heterogeneity.  Control over natural resources and capacity are imperfect sources of
7vertical integration allowing us to focus on the key assumptions generating separate
strategic groups within an industry.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section III looks at the
efficiency of sustainable configurations while, in Section IV, we conduct comparative
statics on sustainable industry configurations as the size of the market increases and
show that industries will evolve from the purely entrepreneurial to mixed and then
eventually, a pure monopoly.  A final section concludes.
I Firm Size and Organisational Mode
We begin by presenting and motivating a set of assumptions regarding the
interactions between firm size, technological choice and organisational mode.  The
purpose here is to explore the nature of cost functions in alternative organisational
modes that will be used in our general theory of equilibrium firm size heterogeneity.
We will show that the organisational mode for an individual firm changes with its
desired size.  In the next section, we go on to endogenise firm size within an industry
equilibrium model.
There are two types of firms. Firms that are owned and managed by
entrepreneurs are termed entrepreneurial.  These firms use entrepreneurial effort to
enhance productivity.  Entrepreneurs face a strictly convex opportunity cost of effort,
gi(ei), where i is the total effort supplied by entrepreneur i.  Marginal effort cost is
assumed to approach infinity as effort approaches some finite maximum.11  However, it
is assumed that the conditions under which entrepreneurial effort is supplied are such
that each firm will only employ a single entrepreneur.  This means that the index i
identifies the entrepreneur as well as the firm.  We do not model the rationale for this
assumption here,12 simply capturing it by assuming the entrepreneurial effort costs are
superadditive.  All of these assumptions are summarised as (A1):
                                                
11 This is a reasonable assumption given that entrepreneurs will have only a finite amount of time to
devote to managerial tasks such as monitoring (Gifford, 1992).
8(A1) gi(ei) is strictly quasi-convex and continuously differentiable with
.  Total costs from employing more than one entrepreneur
are superadditive, that is, .
The second type of firm we term managerial.  Such firms do not find it optimal
to employ entrepreneurial effort in production.  The existence of incentive contracts or
efficiency wage payments that mitigate the need for monitoring mean the entrepreneurial
input is not necessary for labour management purposes.13 Therefore, managerial firms
are not constrained by the limited attention of the entrepreneur.
There are two production technologies available to all firms.  These technologies
produce goods that are perfect substitutes.  The entrepreneurial technology,14
subscripted by E, is a backstop technology that exhibits constant returns to scale and is
reliant on entrepreneurial effort: , where li is the amount of labour
devoted to this production process,  is the marginal productivity of labour
using the entrepreneurial technology, qi is the output of firm i, and  is the
level of effort supplied by the entrepreneur.  Thus, total cost for firm i using the
                                                                                                                                           
arise when multiple entrepreneurs form a partnership (Hart and Moore, 1990; Abreu, Milgrom and
Pearce, 1991).  Further problems arise if partners differ in ability but an equal sharing rule is imposed
(Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988). 
13  This is demonstrated in the Appendix extending a model from Milgrom and Roberts (1992, Chapter
9entrepreneurial technology is iven by,  where  is the
wage paid by such firms. Under (A1), average cost, ACE(qi), is either everywhere
increasing or U-shaped.
The managerial production technology, subscripted by M, does not use
entrepreneurial effort as an input. Instead, it is an increasing returns to scale
technology using only labour: where F represents a fixed input
requirement.  For simplicity, as in many models in industrial organisation (Krugman,
1990), we assume that this takes the form of pure labour overhead.  Costs for this
technology are given by .
With a constant wage, average costs for managerial firms are decreasing
everywhere (i.e., display subadditivity).  However, marginal labour costs, 
and , both potentially depend on the level of output.  The reason for this
could be span of control issues (McAfee and McMillan, 1995; Qian, 1994; Aghion and
Tirole, 1995), coordination issues (Kaldor, 1934; Penrose, 1959; Arrow, 1974; Becker
and Murphy, 1992), influence costs (Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) or monitoring
costs (Williamson, 1981).  These could constrain the size of managerial firms if their
rate of increase was faster than the technological gains from scale economies.  However,
10
incentive or efficiency wage contracts for monitoring mean that unit labour costs are
potentially bounded from above.  In the appendix, we analyse this possibility in a simple
efficiency wage model.  Although it is rationalised by that model, here, we simply make
the assumption that wages in the managerial firm rises at a sufficiently low rate to
generate declining long run average costs.
(A2) .
Figure 1: Entrepreneurial Versus Managerial Average Costs
Costs
Output
ENTREPRENEURIAL
MANAGERIAL
q*
Figure 1 shows the average cost curves for the two technologies. Up to some
minimum output, q*, average cost is lower for the entrepreneurial technology, but cost-
minimisation beyond this point requires adoption of the managerial technology.  In this
figure, the entrepreneurial technology actually has higher minimum average costs than
the managerial technology for high output levels.  This need not be the case.  If the
opportunity costs of entrepreneurial effort are low, then average costs for an
entrepreneurial firm might be lower than that of a managerial firm operating at a high
11
output level.  Alternatively, this could be the case if the entrepreneurial technology is
more efficient at the margin.
II Industry Equilibrium
The previous section stated assumptions under which there is a non-convexity in
average costs for a given firm.  Firm output is determined endogenously as part of an
industry equilibrium.  In this section, we analyse equilibrium outcomes using the notion
of a sustainable industry configuration as defined by Baumol et.al. (1982).15
We consider an industry that produces a homogeneous good, the market
demand for which is described by a continuous function  where
 is the price of firm i, I is the set of firms in the industry and
 is a parameter that describes the size of the market.  We assume:
(A3) D is nonincreasing in each price and is increasing in .
The Entrepreneurial Fringe
We assume that entrepreneurial opportunities are a scarce resource for the
industry:16
12
(A4)  is nondecreasing in i.
Because they use a constant returns to scale technology, we model entrepreneurial firms
as competitive, taking the price, p, of the good as given.  By (A1) and (A4), as the
number of firms in the industry rises, the marginal cost of effort for the marginal firm in
the industry is nondecreasing.
The entrepreneurial fringe is defined as the set of all firms adopting the
entrepreneurial technology, whether or not their output is positive at any given price.
(A4) implies that the long run supply curve for the entrepreneurial fringe of the industry
is rising.  Formally, we can express the total quantity supplied by the entrepreneurial
fringe in the long-run as a nondecreasing function, S(p) of the market price, p.17 The
qualitative properties of the long run competitive supply curve play a critical role in the
results that follow.
The assumption that the long-run supply curve for the entrepreneurial fringe,
while critical to our argument, is a relatively weak assumption.  It can be supported by
many alternative conditions similar in effect to (A4).18  Basically, we are ruling out
situations where there are unlimited opportunities for entrepreneurs to enter the market
or even where those opportunities are unlimited, different entrepreneurs have different
abilities and capabilities.  Hence, the more productive ntrepreneurs will enter the
industry first.
Managerial Firms
Managerial firms use the increasing returns to scale technology.  Therefore,
assuming (A2), they exhibit falling long run average costs.  Hence, if this were the only
prevailing technology, theindustry would be traditionally characterised as a natural
                                                
17  In graphical illustrations below, S(p) is a continuous function.  The theoretical analysis below does
not require such an assumption.
18  For instance, Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), in a model based on Knight (1921), assume that
potential entrepreneurs differ in terms of their degree of absolute risk aversion.  Since entrepreneurs are
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monopoly.19  Only one firm with access to this technology will enter into production in
the industry.  For convenience, we will refer to this managerial firm as firm 0.  This firm
could be a price maker.  However, for the moment, it will be assumed that the constraint
of potential competition ensures that firm 0 will set price equal to average cost.
Therefore, any industry configuration will have at most one managerial firm and if this
firm produces positive output,
.
Since the good produced by both types of firm is homogenous, the residual demand
faced by this individual firm can be represented by,  = D(.) - S(p).
Sustainable Industry Configurations
An industry configuration is a list of prices and outputs for each firm i in the
industry.20  Here we list the standard definition of a sustainable industry configuration
and a sustainable natural monopoly.
Definition (Sustainable Industry Configuration).  An industry configuration,
, is sustainable if,
(i)  industry supply equals market demand, Q = D(.);
(ii) all active firms earn nonnegative profits, i.e.,  with qi > 0;
(iii) all inactive firms (taking prevailing prices as given) earn nonpositive
profits on entry.
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Definition (Sustainable Natural Monopoly).  A sustainable industry configuration is
a natural monopoly if  and .
It may be that no sustainable industry configuration exists for a given market demand,
D(.).  Baumol et.al. (1982) provide examples of non-existence based on th  integer
problem.  However, given the residual demand curve facing the managerial firm, the
existence of a sustainable allocation in our problem is equivalent to the existence of a
sustainable allocation in the problems examined by Baumol et.al. (1982).  In particular,
in the single-good case, if average cost is everywhere decreasing, a sustainable allocation
with at most one managerial firm must exist.  Note that whereas in Baumol et al (1982),
sustainable allocations with zero managerial firms are trivial, in our model they
correspond to competitive allocations.
With this we can state the following necessary and sufficient conditions for the
industry to be a sustainable natural monopoly.
Proposition 1.  Assume (A1) - (A4).  Let  and let .  Then,
if a sustainable industry configuration exists, it is a sustainable natural monopoly if
and only if .
Under this condition, the price at which the managerial firm breaks even is lower than
the highest price that would allow positive output by the entrepreneurial fringe (Figure
2).21
Figure 2: A Sustainable Natural Monopoly
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In addition, we can state necessary and sufficient conditions for the sustainable
industry configuration to be composed solely of entrepreneurial firms (Figure 3).
Proposition 2.   Assume (A1) - (A4). Let  be the inverse demand
function for firm 0.  Then a necessary and sufficient condition for in
any sustainable industry configuration is that , for all .
Figure 3: A Sustainable Configuration with Entrepreneurial Firms Only
16
 Costs 
Quantity 
D 
D 
S ( p ) 
d 
MC 0 
AC 0 
0 
p 
Q 
d 
Figure 4: A Mixed Sustainable Configuration
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This condition means that residual demand lies below the long run average cost curve of
the managerial firm, not allowing it to break even at any output level (Figure 3). This will
occur if wages and fixed costs are high, and the marginal product of labour is low
17
The conditions on market demand and fringe supply curves for the pure cases of
Propositions 1 and 2 are potentially disjoint.  Provided that the fringe supply curve is of
a particular form, mixed configurations, comprising a managerial firm and a number of
entrepreneurial firms are, therefore, possible.
Proposition 3.   Assume (A1) - (A3).  A necessary condition for there to exist a market
demand, D(.), that supports a mixed industry configuration with S(p) > 0 and
, is that S(p) be strictly increasing for some p.
An increasing fringe supply generates the possibility of sustainable industry
configurations with both entrepreneurial firms and a managerial firm (see Figure 4).  If
entrepreneurial opportunities are unlimited (that is, (A3) did not hold or ),
then the long-run supply curve from entrepreneurial firms is flat, with all entrepreneurial
firms producing at minimum average cost.  In thi  case, the only possible industry
configurations are those composed of entirely of entrepreneurial firms or a natural
monopoly.  On the other hand, mixed configurations become more likely when there is a
limited supply of quality entrepreneurs.  In this case, while fringe supply might be
positive for low prices, it rises steeply as entrepreneurs with low opportunity costs
become scarce.
Other Large and Medium Size Firms
The above model makes an explicit prediction that if a mixed configuration
occurs it consists of a single large firm and many smaller firms.  All of the results above
hold for more general models including those in which the managerial firm is a multi-
product firm and there is more than a single input into production.  The key conditions
are technological -- that entrepreneurial firms have U-shaped average cost curves with
low minimum efficient scales relative to the size of the market and that the managerial
18
large relative to the size of the market.  The former condition ensures competition among
entrepreneurial firms and the latter ensures that only one managerial firm enters the
market.  All of the above results would apply, without qualification, to general
technologies of that kind.
To see this, suppose that there exists “intermediate” technologies in which
firms can choose their level of fixed costs, with greater levels of fixed costs enhancing
labour productivity.  That is, M is a function of F with  for
.22  Despite the endogeneity of F, these technologies display
subadditivity in costs and hence, under our assumptions (effectively, of Bertrand
competition), in any sustainable industry configuration, only one firm will enter
incurring the level of fixed costs that minimises average costs subject o output
generated by the entrepreneurial fringe. Hence, to amend the model to allow for medium
size firms and other large firms we need to look elsewhere.
By relaxing the constant returns assumption for entrepreneurial firms, it is
possible to consider monopolistic competition among firms in the entrepreneurial fringe
and, by providing limits on the extent of scale economies, we can allow for natural
duopoly or oligopoly in the managerial firm sector.  Alternatively, the assumption of
Bertrand equilibrium implicit in the use of the sustainability concept could be replaced
by an alternative such as Cournot equilibrium, which could support two or more firms,
assuming that anti-trust or strategic considerations precluded merger.  The intricacies of
such cases are, however, beyond the scope of the present work.  They would require a
consideration of the public good and strategic considerations in forestalling entry and in
merger decisions (see Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983).
Of critical importance in many of the above results is the elasticity of the fringe
19
elastic (see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, pp.334-339).  Under such an
assumption, there are only two types of industry configurations -- entrepreneurial
competitive equilibria and sustainable natural monopolies (see Proposition 3).  However,
there are several alternative ways in which S(p) could be upward sloping in addition to
the entrepreneurial differences assumed here.  Suppose that managerial firms produce a
slightly better quality good or a good that appeals to a large number of cons ers.
Then the managerial firm has some monopoly power over the good.  This could be the
result of sunk costs in advertising (Sutton, 1991), product innovation (Sutton, 1996), or
product differentiation (von Ungern-Stenberg, 1988).  In this case, the monopolist
supplies the differentiated product at a different price from the fringe’s product but both
supply positive amounts.  The fringe’s supply curve is upward sloping because
competition among entrepreneurial firms involves close but imperfect substitutes.  But
their products are less substitutable for the managerial firm’s product.  Stern (1995) and
Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997) provide empirical evidence for low degrees of
substitutability among goods supplied by large as opposed to fringe firms (that is,
branded versus generic suppliers).  Thus, the incorporation of product differentiation
would enhance the conclusions of this paper.  Nonetheless, the key driving force for
heterogeneity among firms remains technological and organisational rather than
preference related.
III Efficient Industry Configurations
As a response to the conceptual nd practical difficulties in establishing the
optimal size of firms in an industry, Stigler (1958) formulated the “survivor principle.”
That principle asserted that, if firms of a given size were observed to continue production
in an industry over a period of time, this would be considered the optimal firm size.
Stigler quotes John Stuart Mill as an antecedent to this principle:
Whether or not the advantages obtained by operating on a large-scale preponderate in
any particular case over the more watchful attention, and greater regard to minor gains
and losses usually found in small establishments, can be ascertained, in a state of free
20
establishments in the same business, that one of the two which in existing
circumstances carries on the production at the greater advantage will be able to
undersell the other. (Mill quoted by Stigler, 1958, p.27).
Stigler then argues that oligopolistic industries too, if contestable, will eliminate firms of
inefficient size.
The model of this paper, by showing how a distribution of firm sizes is
determined endogenously, can shed light on the applicability of the survivor principle
and other theories that posit that free entry and exit leads to least cost production in
homogenous product industries (e.g., Baumol et.al., 1982).  In this section, we analyse
whether observed industry configurations are, in fact, efficient.
There is, potentially, a difference between efficient and sustainable industry
configurations.  First, we need to state what we mean by efficiency.
Definition (Efficiency).  An efficient industry configuration maximises consumer
surplus in the industry subject to the requirement that firms break even and charge
linear prices.
This definition neglects any entrepreneurial rents.23  It is also different from an
unconstrained definition of efficiency without break-even or linear price constraints. 24
Efficiency without such constraints would involve all units being produced with the
minimum marginal cost.  Thus, it could involve some “good” entrepreneurial firms
producing a fraction of demand and the managerial firm supplying the rest.  Typically,
however, this equilibrium is not sustainable in the absence of some subsidisation of the
managerial firm.
For any given market demand, a natural monopoly is an efficient industry
configuration in the sense above if , that is, if the managerial firm can
                                                
23 Suppose that the losses in consumer surplus arising in any sustainable industry configuration were
greater than the value of entrepreneurial rents earned.  If the managerial firm could “buy out” the fringe
and prevent their entry, would efficiency be restored?  The possibility that any potential managerial firm
means that entrepreneurial firms will receive all of the surplus generated from this buy out.  As such,
even if the resulting monopoly was constrained to limit price at the original equilibrium price, the total
quantity sold in the market would be the same allowing for the buy out.  So an efficient solution would
not result as the amount of the buy out raises the managerial firms fixed costs.  The precise form that a
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supply the entire market demand at a lower price than the entrepreneurial fringe and still
break even.  This observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4.  Assume (A1) - (A3).  If there exists an industry configuration that is a
sustainable natural monopoly then that configuration is efficient.
PROOF:  Suppose that ; i.e., a natural monopoly is not an efficient
industry configuration.  Suppose now there exists a D(.) such that there is a
sustainable natural monopoly.  By proposition 1, for that D(.), .
Since  and , this implies that , with
the only equality at D(.) = 0.  Therefore, for positive market demand there is a
contradiction.
Note that the converse is not true (Figure 5).  That is, it is possible for purely
entrepreneurial configurations to be efficient.  Therefore, fringe competition could drive
out an efficient natural monopoly.  This is the case in Figure 3.25  Observe, however, that
as S(p) becomes more elastic, the possibility of an inefficient entrepreneurial
configuration is diminished.  Indeed, for a mixed configuration, the efficiency
considerations are unambiguous.26
Proposition 5.   Assume (A1) - (A4).  Any sustainable mixed configuration is inefficient.
This proposition follows directly from the assumption of falling average costs for the
managerial firm and nondecreasing fringe supply.  It implies that consumer surplus will
be raised if entrepreneurial firms are restricted from entry into the industry.
Figure 5: A Sustainable and Efficient Equilibrium with Entrepreneurial Firms
                                                
25  Our results do not preclude the possibility that an unconstrained monopoly could be more efficient
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In conclusion, this section shows that while observed monopoly configurations
can be efficient it is possible that these might be subject to inefficient competition from
an entrepreneurial fringe. Moreover, observed mixed configurations are always
inefficient with a regulated single managerial firm providing greater consumer welfare.
Note these results are under conditions favourable to contestable outcomes and are
obtained without any strategic behaviour being undertaken.  Thus, Stigler’s (1958)
observations of persistence of firms of a wide range of sizes does not necessarily
support his conclusions that average cost curves are flat over a large range of output.
IV Evolution of Market Structure
Chandler (1990) has described in meticulous detail how many industries evolved
from configurations consisting of many entrepreneurial firms to ones in which one or a
couple of large managerial firms dominated market share in the industry.  A natural
question that arises in the context of the model developed in this paper is what factors
might account for such changes?  Here, we identify market size as a possible
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Despite the fact that a multiplicity of sustainable industry configurations i
possible, we can conduct general comparative statics analysis on industry
configurations.  We examine changes in the set of equilibria, in particular, the level of
managerial firm output, q0, as the size of the market increases.
Proposition 6.  Assume (A1) - (A3).  Suppose that S(p) is nondecreasing.  Then the set
of  characterising any sustainable industry configuration is
nondecreasing in the market size parameter, .
PROOF:27  First observe that the left hand side of the condition for an industry
condition involving , , is nondecreasing in , while
the right hand side is unchanging.  Therefore, as market size increases we move
from sustainable configurations with  to ones where this is
positive.  Since S(p) is determined purely by technological and entrepreneurial
supply considerations, as we raise market size in any mixed configuration, the
individual demand curve facing the managerial firm rises and given the declining
average costs, so does .  This also holds for situations in which
the industry configuration is a sustainable natural monopoly.  Finally, note that
as market size increases  falls while  stays
unchanged.
Thus, as the size of the market grows the industry becomes more concentrated
with a dominant firm emerging.  This evolution of sustainable industry configurations is
summarised in Figure 6.  The total output of entrepreneurial firms falls as the market
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grows.  This is because a larger market raises the demand curve for the managerial firm
and allows it to reduce price without making a loss.  This reduction in price causes some
entrepreneurial firms to leave the market.  Thus, both the market share and output level
of the entrepreneurial fringe falls.
Figure 6: Efficient and Sustainable Configurations for Different Market Sizes
Pure Entrepreneurial Mixed Pure Monopoly
Efficient Inefficient Efficient
Greater Market Size
V Conclusions and Future Directions
The size distribution of firms has received relatively little attention in the
industrial organisation literature. In popular discussions of the economy a clear
distinction is often drawn between ‘big business’ and ‘small business’. However,
models of the size distribution of firms based either on stochastic growth processes or
heterogeneity in entrepreneurial opportunities suggest that no distinction of this kind is
justified. The properties of the Pareto distribution that arises from the stochastic
Gibrat’s Law approach are such as to suggest that any point at which a division might
be drawn is as good or as bad as any other point.
The model advanced here is based on a qualitative distinction between
organisational modes rather than on continuous random variables. The key result is that,
under a range of demand and cost conditions, multiple organisational modes can co-
exist, creating a size distribution of firms quite different from that arising from random
variation in growth rates or entrepreneurial ability.
The analysis here could be extended in a number of ways. The most interesting
avenues involve introducing dynamics. Two dynamic processes that might be considered
are the conversion of one or more entrepreneurial firms in an initially competitive
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industry into managerial enterprises and the diversification of existing managerial
enterprises into industries previously populated by entrepreneurial firms.
A further avenue would be the introduction of a stochastic element, permitting
the derivation of statistically testable predictions about the relationship between size and
growth rates and about the equilibrium population distribution. We conjecture that firms
in a medium-size output range, lying between the largest optimal output for an
entrepreneurial firm and the minimum efficient scale for a managerial firm will display
highly variable and highly skewed growth rates, pursuing in effect a strategy of ‘get big
or get out.’
Finally, although the model presents a solution to the puzzle of large and small
firms, it does not appear to generate sustainable industry configurations involving more
than one large firm coexisting with a fringe of small firms. As noted earlier, such
configurations may perhaps be explained by considerations of product differentiation.
Alternatively, it may be that observed configurations of this kind are not sustainable
equilibria in the sense defined above. Profitable mergers between large firms may be
prohibited under antitrust laws or discouraged by strategic considerations such as those
examined by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983).
Finally, the model presented here also has potential policy implications. The case
of inefficient mixed equilibria may be seen as a link between the concept of
unsustainable natural monopoly and the older d bate over the potential for ‘cream-
skimming’ in natural monopoly industries with open entry.
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Appendix:
Here we consider an example where the organisational mode is modeled
explicitly using the efficiency wage model of Becker and Stigler (1974), as amended by
Milgrom and Roberts (1992).  In this example, complementarities between technological
and organisational choices give rise to the basic nonconvexity illustrated in Figure 1.
In addition to providing a direct input into production, the entrepreneur
contributes to labour management.  That is, the entrepreneur can devote effort to
reducing total labour costs.  To take a simple case, suppose that workers can potentially
be employed but supply zero labour productivity, with  = 0, due to the possibility of
“shirking.”  If workers do not shirk,  = 1.  This underlying labour productivity
function is common across entrepreneurial and managerial firms.  Shirking workers,
however, could be caught with probability , in which case they lose their job and receive
a reservation wage, .  Suppose that the worker’s private gain to shirking
is g.  Then there are two instruments by which entrepreneurs can deter shirking.  First,
they can employ workers for an efficiency wage that gives workers a premium for
employment within the firm making them indifferent between shirking or not.  That
minimum efficiency wage is given by the following expression: .
Second, they can raise the detection probability by devoting effort to monitoring the
worker: , where  is the effort required to achieve a
detection probability of  and M is a increasing, convex function with .
The latter assumption simply says that when no effort is devoted to monitoring there
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Given this, total labour costs are .  Substituting in the efficiency
wage function, these costs become solely a function of the choice of : .
In terms of labour costs, a greater labour force and greater monitoring will be substitutes
if .  In this case, the unit cost of employing labour is everywhere
(weakly) increasing in monitoring intensity.  This is because unit monitoring costs are
assumed to rise more than the reduction in the efficiency wage.
Given the technological specifications, when we consider the costs of
entrepreneurial effort as well as labour costs, greater employment and greater monitoring
intensity are substitutes almost everywhere.  Consider first the case where the
entrepreneurial technology is used.  In this case, raising employment is complementary
with greater effort devoted to production.  Because effort costs are convex, effort in
production is a substitute with monitoring effort. Therefore, employment and
monitoring intensity are substitutes in entrepreneurial as well as labour costs and, as
such, raising li reduces the optimal choice of .
The same is true if the increasing returns technology is used. While the
entrepreneurial effort substitution effect is no longer relevant here, employment and
monitoring intensity are substitutes in terms of labour costs.  Hence, larger employment
will result in lower monitoring intensity.  For a firm that is sufficiently large, no
monitoring may take place at all if monitoring intensity is the same for all workers.  If
monitoring intensity is variable, monitoring effort is likely o become focused on a
smaller proportion of workers.  Either way, total effort devoted to monitoring will fall as
the firm grows large.
Finally, if the technology switches from the entrepreneurial to managerial when
employment increases, it is pos ible that monitoring intensity could rise during the
transition.  This is because the switch in technology relieves the entrepreneur of a direct
production role and switches this to labour cost reduction.  Locally, around the
switching point of employment, monitoring intensity will rise and efficiency wages will
fall.  Note that this means that for a small range in employment, the opportunity cost of
monitoring falls rather than rises.  Thus, a nonconcavity in the returns to monitoring is
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As firm output grows, monitoring intensity falls.  Therefore, the organisational
mode switches from one that relies on an entrepreneurial role in production to a
managerial mode that is not constrained by the limited attention of the entrepreneur.  The
possibility of switching to the increasing returns to scale technology and to switching to
labour discipline devices, other than direct monitoring, means that firm size is
unconstrained.  A typical firm has a nonconvex average cost function as depicted in
Figure 1.
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